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INTRODUCTION
Initiatives to create safer and more efficient
driving conditions have recently begun to draw
strong support. Vehicular communications (VC)
will play a central role in this effort, enabling a
variety of applications for safety, traffic efficiency,
driver assistance, and infotainment. For example,
warnings for environmental hazards (e.g., ice on
the pavement) or abrupt vehicle kinetic changes
(e.g., emergency braking), traffic and road con-
ditions (e.g., congestion or construction sites),
and tourist information downloads will be pro-
vided by these systems.
Vehicular networking protocols will allow
nodes, that is, vehicles or roadside infrastructure
units, to communicate with each other over sin-
gle or multiple hops. In other words, nodes will
act both as end points and routers, with vehicu-
lar networks emerging as the first commercial
instantiation of the mobile ad hoc networking
technology.
The self-organizing operation and the unique
features of VC are a double-edged sword: a rich
set of tools are offered to drivers and authori-
ties, but a formidable set of abuses and attacks
becomes possible. Hence, the security of vehicu-
lar networks is indispensable, because otherwise
these systems could make antisocial and criminal
behavior easier, in ways that would actually jeop-
ardize the benefits of their deployment. What
makes VC security hard to achieve is the tight
coupling between applications, with rigid
requirements, and the networking fabric, as well
as the societal, legal, and economical considera-
tions. Solutions to this problem involve industry,
governments, and academia, and can have a
broad impact.
In this article we are specifically concerned
with the following problem: how to design and
build vehicular communication protocols and
systems that leave as little space as possible for
misbehavior and abuse and, at the same time,
remain resilient to ongoing attacks. We present
an analysis of the vulnerabilities of vehicular net-
works and the salient challenges in securing their
operation. Then we propose our architectural
view of how VC can be secured, along with a
brief (due to space limitations) overview of novel
certificate revocation protocols tailored to the
VC environment. Finally, we survey related
works and discuss a few open issues in this
emerging area of research.
VULNERABILITIES AND CHALLENGES
VULNERABILITIES
Any wireless-enabled device that runs a rogue
version of the vehicular communication protocol
stack poses a threat. We denote such rogue
devices deviating from the defined protocols as
adversaries or attackers.
The adoption of a variant of the widely
deployed IEEE 802.11 protocol1 by the vehicle
manufacturers makes the attacker’s task easier.
And even possession of credentials cannot
ensure alone the correct operation of the nodes.
The effects of differing types of attackers (inter-
nal or external, rational or malicious, indepen-
dent or colluding, persistent or random) can
clearly differ. Here, rather than analyzing specif-
ic protocols, we are after a general exploration
of VC vulnerabilities.
Jamming — The jammer deliberately generates
interfering transmissions that prevent communi-
cation within their reception range. As the net-
work coverage area (e.g., along a highway) can
be well-defined, at least locally, jamming is a
low-effort exploit opportunity. As Fig. 1 illus-
trates, an attacker can relatively easily, without
compromising cryptographic mechanisms and
with limited transmission power, partition the
vehicular network.
Forgery — The correctness and timely receipt of
application data is a major vulnerability. Figure
2 illustrates the rapid “contamination” of large
portions of the vehicular network coverage area
with false information where a single attacker
forges and transmits false hazard warnings (e.g.,
ice formation on the pavement), which are taken
up by all vehicles in both traffic streams.
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we also outline several open problems.
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In-transit Traffic Tampering — Any node acting as a
relay can disrupt communications of other nodes:
it can drop or corrupt messages, or meaningfully
modify messages. In this way, the reception of
valuable or even critical traffic notifications or
safety messages can be manipulated. Moreover,
attackers can replay messages (e.g., to illegiti-
mately obtain services such as traversing a toll
check point). In fact, tampering with in-transit
messages may be simpler and more powerful
than forgery attacks.
Impersonation — Message fabrication, alteration, and
replay can also be used towards impersonation.
Arguably, the source of messages, identified at
each layer of the stack, may be of secondary impor-
tance. Often, it is not the source but the content
(e.g., hazard warning) and the attributes of the
message (freshness, locality, relevance to the
receiver) that count the most. However, an imper-
sonator can be a threat: consider, for example, an
attacker masquerading as an emergency vehicle to
mislead other vehicles to slow down and yield; or
an adversary impersonating roadside units, spoof-
ing service advertisements or safety messages.
Privacy Violation — With vehicular networks
deployed, the collection of vehicle-specific infor-
mation from overheard vehicular communica-
tions will become particularly easy. Then
inferences on the drivers’ personal data could be
made, and thus violate her or his privacy.2 The
vulnerability lies in the periodic and frequent
vehicular network traffic: safety and traffic man-
agement messages, context-aware data access
(e.g., maps, ferryboat schedules), transaction-
based communications (e.g., automated pay-
ments, car diagnostics), or other control
messages (e.g., over-the-air registration with
local highway authorities). In all such occasions,
messages will include, by default, information
(e.g., time, location, vehicle identifier, technical
description, trip details) that could precisely
identify the originating node (vehicle) as well as
the drivers’ actions and preferences (Fig. 3).
On-board Tampering — Beyond abuse of the com-
munication protocols, the attacker may select to
tinker with data (e.g., velocity, location, status of
vehicle parts) at their source, tampering with the
on-board sensing and other hardware. In fact, it
may be simpler to replace or by-pass the real-
time clock or the wiring of a sensor, rather than
modifying the binary code implementation of the
data collection and communication protocols.
Any VC security architecture should achieve a
trade-off between robustness and cost due to
tamper-proof hardware.
CHALLENGES
The operational conditions, the constraints, and
the user requirements for VC systems make
security a challenging problem, with the most
significant challenges specific to the VC dis-
cussed here.
Network Volatility — The connectivity among
nodes can often be highly transient and a one-
time event. For example, two vehicles (nodes)
traveling on a highway may remain within their
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transceiver range, or within a few wireless hops,
for a limited period of time. In other words,
vehicular networks lack the relatively long-lived
context and, possibly, the personal contact of the
device users of a connection to a hot spot or the
recurrent connection to an on-line service across
the Internet. Hence password-based establish-
ment of secure channels, gradual development
of trust by enlarging a circle of trusted acquain-
tances, or secure communication only with a
handful of endpoints may be impractical for
securing VC.
Liability vs. Privacy — To make the problem more
difficult, accountability and, eventually, liability
of the vehicles and their drivers are required.
Vehicular communication is envisioned as an
excellent opportunity to obtain hard-to-refute
data that can assist legal investigations (e.g., in
the case of accidents). This implies that, to begin
with, unambiguous identification of the vehicles
as sources of messages should be possible. More-
over, context-specific information, such as coor-
dinates, time intervals, and associated vehicles,
should be possible to extract or reconstruct. But
such requirements raise even stronger privacy
concerns. This is even more so when drivers’
biometrics are considered: biometrics, useful for
enhancing vehicle access and control methods,
are highly private and unique data that cannot
be reset or reassigned.
Delay-Sensitive Applications — Many of the envi-
sioned safety and driver-assistance applications
pose strict deadlines for message delivery or are
time-sensitive. Security mechanisms must take
these constraints into consideration and impose
low processing and messaging overhead. Not
only must protocols be lightweight, but also
robust to clogging denial-of-service attacks. Oth-
erwise, it would suffice for an adversary to gen-
erate a high volume of bogus messages and
consume resources so that message delivery is
delayed beyond the application requirements
and thus, in practice, denied.
Network Scale — The scale of the network, with
roughly a billion vehicles around the globe, is
another challenge. This, combined with the mul-
titude of authorities governing transportation
systems, makes the design of a facility to provide
cryptographic keys a challenge per se. A techni-
cally and perhaps politically convincing solution
is a prerequisite for any security architecture.
Heterogeneity — The heterogeneity in VC tech-
nologies and the supported applications are
additional challenges, especially taking into
account the gradual deployment. With nodes
possibly equipped with cellular transceivers, digi-
tal audio and Global Positioning System (GPS)
or Galileo receivers, reliance on such external
infrastructure should not be the weakest link in
achieving security. For example, if GPS signaling
can be spoofed, can the correctness of node
coordinates and time accuracy be assumed? Sec-
ond, with a range of applications with differing
requirements, security solutions must retain flexi-
bility, yet remain efficient and interoperable.
SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
In this section we present the components need-
ed to protect VC against a wide range of threats,
some of which are described in the previous sec-
tion. We also aim at providing an authentication,
authorization, accounting (AAA) framework for
VC. Figure 4 depicts the general architecture,
the components of which are described next.
SECURITY HARDWARE
Among the vehicle onboard equipment, there
should be two hardware modules needed for
security, namely, the event data recorder (EDR)
and the tamper-proof device (TPD). Whereas
the EDR only provides tamper-proof storage,
the TPD also possesses cryptographic processing
capabilities.
The EDR will be responsible for recording
the vehicle’s critical data, such as position,
speed, time, and so forth, during emergency
events, and is similar to an airplane’s black box.
These data will help in accident reconstruction
and the attribution of liability. EDRs are already
installed in many road vehicles, especially trucks.
These can be extended to also record the safety
messages received during critical events.
The car electronics, especially the data bus
system, are easily accessible by the owner or by
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a mechanic. Hence the cryptographic keys of a
vehicle need proper hardware protection,
namely,  a TPD. The TPD will  take care of
storing all the cryptographic material and per-
forming cryptographic operations, especially
signing and verifying safety messages. By bind-
ing a set of cryptographic keys to a given vehi-
cle, the TDP guarantees the accountability
property as long as it remains inside the vehi-
cle. The TPD has to be as independent as pos-
sible from its external environment; hence, it
should include its own clock and have a battery
that is periodically recharged from the vehicle’s
electric circuits. Yet, despite all these “fea-
tures,” the TPD will still suffer from the fact
that it cannot control the correctness of the
data it receives. This may result in the TPD
signing messages with bogus data. The solution
to this problem is briefly described in the
“Authentication” subsection.
A major obstacle to the adoption of TPDs is
their high cost. But current products are mainly
intended for computation-hungry financial appli-
cations. Hence, there are several factors that can
facilitate the introduction of TPDs in vehicles:
• The creation of a “lighter” version of TPDs
• The leverage on the building-up expertise for
vehicular EDRs
• The economy of scale that will drive costs sig-
nificantly lower
VEHICULAR PUBLIC KEY INFRASTRUCTURE
The huge number of vehicles registered in dif-
ferent countries and traveling long distances,
well beyond their registration regions, requires a
robust and scalable key management scheme.
The involvement of authorities in vehicle regis-
tration implies the need for a certain level of
centralization. Communication via base stations
(as in cellular networks) is not enough for VC,
mainly because vehicles need to authenticate
themselves not only to base stations, but also to
each other (without invoking any server), which
creates a problem of scalability. In addition,
symmetric cryptography does not provide the
nonrepudiation property that allows the account-
ability of drivers’ actions (e.g., in the case of
accident reconstruction or finding the originators
of forgery attacks). Hence, the use of public key
cryptography is a more suitable (if not the only)
option for deploying VC security.
This implies the need for a Vehicular Public
Key Infrastructure (VPKI) where Certificate
Authorities (CAs) will issue certified public/pri-
vate key pairs to vehicles (with many pairs per
vehicle for privacy reasons, as is explained
below). Similarly to current vehicle registration
authorities, there will be several CAs, each cor-
responding to a given region (e.g., country, state,
metropolitan area, etc.). Other candidates for
n Figure 4. Overview of the security architecture.
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taking the role of CAs are car manufacturers. In
any of the two cases, the different CAs will have
to be cross-certified so that vehicles from differ-
ent regions or different manufacturers can
authenticate each other. This will require each
vehicle to store the public keys of all the CAs
whose certificates it may need to verify. Alter-
nately, in the case where CAs are regional
authorities, vehicles may request new public/pri-
vate key pairs delivered by the foreign region3
they enter.
AUTHENTICATION
The fundamental security functions in VC will
consist in authenticating the origin of a data
packet. Authentication and the inherent integrity
property counter the in-transit traffic tampering
and impersonation vulnerabilities. In addition,
authentication also helps to control the autho-
rization levels of vehicles.
To authenticate each other, vehicles will sign
each message with their private key and attach
the corresponding certificate. Thus, when anoth-
er vehicle receives this message, it verifies the
key used to sign the message and, once this is
done correctly, it verifies the message. To reduce
the security overhead, the common approach is
to use Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) — the
most compact public key cryptosystem thus far.
But it is possible to reduce this overhead by
signing only critical messages (e.g., with accident
warnings) or one in every few messages (the fre-
quency and redundancy of messages can allow
this). In addition, given the frequency of safety
message broadcasts (typically, every 300 ms), a
vehicle can ignore redundant messages.
CERTIFICATE REVOCATION
The advantages of using a PKI for VC are
accompanied by some challenging problems,
notably, certificate revocation. For example, the
certificates of a detected attacker or malfunc-
tioning device have to be revoked, that is, it
should not be able to use its keys or, if it still
does, vehicles verifying them should be made
aware of their invalidity.
n Figure 5. Revocation protocol of the tamper-proof device (RTPD).
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The most common way to revoke certificates
is the distribution of certificate revocation lists
(CRLs) that contain the most recently revoked
certificates; CRLs are provided when infra-
structure is available. In addition, using short-
lived certificates automatically revokes keys.
These are the methods proposed in the IEEE
P1609.2 standard [1]. But there are several
drawbacks to this approach. First, CRLs can be
very long due to the enormous number of vehi-
cles and their high mobility (meaning that a
vehicle can encounter a high number of vehi-
cles when traveling, especially over long dis-
tances). Second, the short lifetime of certificates
still creates a vulnerability window. Last but not
least, the availability of an infrastructure will
not be pervasive, especially in the first years of
deployment.
To avoid the above shortcomings, we have
designed a specific solution. It includes a set of
revocation protocols, namely, Revocation Proto-
col of the Tamper-Proof Device (RTPD), Revo-
cation protocol using Compressed Certificate
Revocation Lists (RCCRL), and Distributed
Revocation Protocol (DRP). In the following,
we present the details of RTPD, as illustrated in
Fig. 5, and only outline the main features of
RCCRL and DRP (due to space constraints). In
RTPD, once the CA has decided to revoke all
the keys of a given vehicle M, it sends to it a
revocation message encrypted with the vehicle’s
public key. After the message is received and
decrypted by the TPD of the vehicle, the TPD
erases all the keys and stops signing safety mes-
sages. Then it sends an ACK to the CA. All the
communications between the CA and the vehicle
take place in this case via base stations. In fact,
the CA has to know the vehicle’s location in
order to select the base station through which it
will send the revocation message. If it does not
know the exact location, it retrieves the most
recent locations of the vehicle from a location
database and defines a paging area with base
stations covering these locations. Then it multi-
casts the revocation message to all these base
stations. In the case when there are no recent
location entries or the ACK is not received after
a timeout, the CA broadcasts the revocation
message, for example, via the low-speed FM
radio on a nationwide scale or via satellite.
The RCCRL protocol is used when the CA
wants to revoke only a subset of a vehicle’s keys
or when the TPD of the target vehicle is
unreachable (e.g., by jamming or by tampering
of the device). Given the expected large size of
CRLs in vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs),
the key idea in RCCRL is to use Bloom filters
— a probabilistic data structure used to test
whether an element is a member of a set. Thus,
the size of a CCRL will be only a few KB.
RCCRL also relies on the availability of infra-
structure that broadcasts the CCRLs once every
10 min. Compared to RTPD, RCCRL has the
special feature of warning the neighbors of a
revoked vehicle as they also receive the CCRLs.
The DRP protocol is used in the pure ad hoc
mode whereby vehicles accumulate accusations
against misbehaving vehicles, evaluate them
using a reputation system, and, in case misbe-
havior is detected, report them to the CA once a
connection is available. Unlike RTPD and
RCCRL, the revocation in DRP is triggered by
the neighbors of a vehicle upon the detection of
misbehavior. Mechanisms for the detection of
malicious data [2] can be leveraged to spot vehi-
cles generating these data (since all messages are
signed).
PRIVACY
To address privacy vulnerability, we propose
using a set of anonymous keys that change fre-
quently (every couple of minutes) according to
the driving speed. Each key expires after its
usage; only one key can be used at a time. These
keys are preloaded in the vehicle’s TPD for a
long duration, e.g., until the next yearly checkup;
the TPD takes care of all the operations related
to key management and usage. Each key is certi-
fied by the issuing CA and has a short lifetime
(e.g., a specific week of the year). In addition, it
can be tracked back to the real identity of the
vehicle — the Electronic License Plate (ELP) —
in case law enforcement necessitates this and
only after obtaining a permission from a judge.
This conditional anonymity will help determine
the liability of drivers in the case of accidents.
n Table 1. Comparison of different network types with respect to security problems. It should be noted here that there exist several mech-
anisms proposed for some network types, but we consider the most widely adopted of these. Thus, for example, we took Pretty Good
Privacy (PGP) as a representative example of Peer-to-Peer (P2P) security in the Internet.
Features
Network type
Cellular, WLAN Sensor Networks P2P (PGP) VANET
Key Management symmetric, centralized symmetric, centralized asymmetric, decentralized asymmetric, multiple authorities
Authentication authentication server pairwise symmetric digital signatures, web oftrust
digital signatures, CA
certificates
Revocation directly by the operator distributed voting counter-certificates short-lived certificates; CRLs
Privacy temporary identifiers NA anonymizing services preloaded keys
Positioning triangulation with basestations
triangulation with
beacons NA open problem
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The downside of this approach is the necessity
for storage space for all the keys for one year,
but these can fit in only a few Mbytes [3].
In the case of infotainment applications in
which vehicles communicate with the infra-
structure, the CARAVAN scheme [4] allows
vehicles to preserve their privacy by forming
groups in which the group leader acts as a proxy
on behalf of all group members that access the
infrastructure. When the vehicles do not have to
access the infrastructure, they remain silent, thus
preventing eavesdroppers from tracking their
pseudonyms.
STATE OF THE ART
ACADEMIC RESEARCH
The research on VC security is just beginning,
with a few pioneer papers published thus far. In
[5], Blum and Eskandarian describe a security
architecture for VC intended mainly to counter
the so-called “intelligent collisions” (meaning
that they are intentionally caused). But this is
only one type of attack, and building the security
architecture requires awareness of as many
potential threats as possible. They propose the
use of a PKI and a virtual infrastructure where
cluster-heads are responsible for reliably dissem-
inating messages (by a sequential unicast instead
of broadcast) after digitally signing them; this
approach creates bottlenecks at cluster-heads in
addition to high security overhead. Gerlach [6]
describes the security concepts for vehicular net-
works. Hubaux et al. [7] take a different perspec-
tive of VC security and focus on privacy and
secure positioning issues. They point out the
importance of the trade-off between liability and
anonymity and also introduce Electronic License
Plates (ELPs), unique electronic identities for
vehicles. Parno and Perrig [8] discuss the chal-
lenges, adversary types, and some attacks
encountered in vehicular networks; they also
describe several security mechanisms that can be
useful in securing these networks. Raya and
Hubaux [3] describe a full security and privacy
framework for VANETs with primary simulation
evaluations of the security overhead. El Zarki et
al. [9] describe an infrastructure for VC and
briefly mention some related security issues and
possible solutions.
Table 1 summarizes the mechanisms used to
provide security features in VC and compares
them with other network types that are broadly
addressed in the literature. We can see that the
distinctive properties of VANETs, notably scale
and high mobility, justify the need for, as well as
the opportunity of, using novel solutions com-
pared to other network types.
INDUSTRIAL PROJECTS
There are many completed and ongoing projects
on VC all over the world. Examples include the
Berkeley PATH project in the United States and
the German project Fleetnet. Yet none of these
early projects has considered the security aspects
of VC. To bridge this gap, new projects are allo-
cating part of their resources to investigate secu-
rity issues. In the following, we provide an
overview of the most relevant ones.
The IEEE P1609.2 standard [1] is part of the
DSRC standards for VC supported by the U.S.
Vehicle Safety Communication Consortium
(VSCC). It proposes using asymmetric cryptog-
raphy to sign safety messages with frequently
changing keys so that anonymity is preserved.
There is no mechanism proposed for certificate
revocation. Instead, certificates have short life-
times and are periodically requested by vehicles
through roadside base stations, implying the
need for a pervasive infrastructure.
In Europe, VC security is partially considered
within the projects Network on Wheels (NoW)
and Global System for Telematics (GST) as well
as by the Car2Car Communication Consortium
(C2C-CC). It is being fully addressed by the new
European project SEVECOM (that stands for
Secure Vehicular Communications), which focus-
es on providing a full definition and implemen-
tation of security requirements for VC.
OPEN PROBLEMS
In addition to the main building blocks present-
ed earlier, there remains a set of unexplored
problems directly related to VC security. In this
section we outline the most important of these
problems.
Secure Positioning — In VC, position is one of the
most important data for vehicles. Each vehicle
needs to know not only its own position but also
those of other vehicles in its neighborhood. GPS
signals are weak, can be spoofed, and are prone
to jamming. Moreover, vehicles can intentionally
lie about their positions. Hence, the need for a
secure positioning system that will also support
the accountability and authorization properties,
frequently related to a vehicle’s position.
Data Verification — This helps to prevent the forg-
ing attacks illustrated in Fig. 2. This can be
achieved by a data correlation mechanism that
compares all collected data regarding a given
event. A first example of such a mechanism is
presented in [2], where the vehicle has a model
to which it compares received data before classi-
fying it as truthful, malicious, or unintentionally
incorrect.
DoS Resilience — DoS attacks, and especially jam-
ming, are relatively simple to mount, yet their
effects can be devastating. Existing solutions
such as frequency hopping do not completely
solve the problem. The use of multiple radio
transceivers, operating in disjoint frequency
bands, can be a feasible approach.
CONCLUSION
In this article we have described the problems
that characterize the security of vehicular net-
works and sketched possible solutions. As we
have seen, some of these solutions can leverage
on existing security techniques. However, we
also have stressed that vehicular communications
exhibit unique security challenges, induced by
the high speed and sporadic connectivity of the
vehicles (especially with the infrastructure), the
high relevance of their geographic location, the
tension between liability and privacy, and the
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huge scale and very gradual deployment of the
network. Only a coordinated effort of all parties
involved (vehicle manufacturers, transportation
authorities, law enforcement agencies, insurance
companies, and academic researchers) will make
it possible to devise a solution that is compliant
with the demanding requirements of this fasci-
nating area.
Interested readers can visit http://ivc.epfl.ch
for more information on this topic.
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